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DILEMMA IN PARENTHOOD: SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS
OF HUMAN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
Arthur A. Levisohn *
H UMAN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION is used today more frequently
than is commonly known; and just for this reason it is be-
ing heatedly discussed in its various implications in medical,
religious, legal and social circles. The emotional intensity which
all too often characterizes these discussions has contributed little
to truly clarifying the various issues. In this paper, however,
an attempt is made to analyze the problem sine ira and thus
promote an objective view of this paramount question.
I have long felt that the socio-medical advance which has
been made in the matter of human artificial insemination has been
scientifically possible as an additional facet to the already rec-
ognized pattern of family disorganization which is so charac-
teristic of society today. As such, it must be received with an
eye toward creating new concepts toward the family as an in-
stitution, despite the ideals and aspirations, one might even say
traditions, which form stumbling blocks to an unbiased study of
family situations.
* LL.B., Chicago-Kent College of Law; M.D., Chicago Medical School; Professor
of Medical Jurisprudence, Chicago Medical School. Member, Chicago, Illinois and
American Bar Associations; The American Board of Legal Medicine; Chicago,
Illinois and American Medical Associations. This paper is substantially the same
as one appearing in, and is reprinted with permission granted by, The Journal of
Forensic Medicine. See 4 J. Forensic Med. 147-72 (1957).
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Ernest Mowrer, the sociologist, once defined and described
the phenomenon of family disorganization, and accounted for the
resistance to change within the family, by saying:
Most of our knowledge of the contemporary family is highly
tentative, if not speculative, as is true also of our informa-
tion of many other social institutions in modern life. And
yet in a sense research in the modern family has lagged
behind social research in general, owing to the emotional
attachment to the family experience. Ideals and aspirations
have got in the way of seeing family relations without bias.
Much more pleasing results have been obtained by wishful
thinking. This, however, has only thwarted human desires
by making projection and control impossible, or, what is often
worse, encouraged endless controversy, which has impeded,
rather than facilitated, adjustment to modern conditions.'
Conservative theologians and others who try desperately to main-
tain established or traditional ways of thinking and believing,
consequently, deplore most vocally the acceptance of artificial
insemination on moral and religious grounds. But the tide can-
not be stemmed.
It will, then, become necessary for people to re-orient them-
selves to new horizons for the family as a social institution,
but it is not my purpose to go into this wide field further than
to point out that artificial insemination, both heterologous2 and
homologous,3 will be viewed against the general background of
family disintegration and re-organization. While resistance to
change is to be expected and is part of the institutionalizing
process, the social forces which cause change defy permanent
resistance.
1 Mowrer, The Family, Its Organization and Disorganization (University of
Chicago Press, 1939), p. 280.
2 Hereinafter referred to as AID, being artificial insemination by a donor's
semen.
3 Hereinafter referred to as AIH, meaning artificial insemination by semen of
the husband.
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Artificial insemination is not new and it is here to stay.
One case is recorded in the eighteenth century, the physician
being the English practitioner Dr. John Hunter.4 Dr. J. Marion
Sims performed artificial insemination in the United States in
1866, but subsequently came to the conclusion that the practice
was immoral and abandoned it. The practice may be said to
have lain dormant, at least officially, for almost a century; but
it has grown unofficially to such proportions that it can no longer
be ignored by legal authorities.
What is new about artificial insemination is first, an in-
creasing prevalence in its use, and second, the fact that a body
of opinion is emerging which approves of it, at least to a major
degree, and even encourages it. It has been estimated that at
least 50,000 "test tube" babies have been born in the United
States. All statistics are mere estimates, of course, because
officially no records are kept except in the City of New York.'
However, according to Professor Ritchie Davis' estimate, the
actual number may be anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000, while
a quarter of a century ago there were fewer than 200 recorded
cases in the entire world.
This increasing resort to the practice of artificial insemina-
tion has come about partly because of the large number of in-
fertile husbands, of whom there are at least a million in the
United States. Most married couples desire to have children.
The demand for orphans whom childless couples may adopt gen-
erally exceeds the supply,7 but even if there were enough or-
phans to go around, many couples desire children of their own
creation. For such couples, artificial insemination would be a
preferable recourse although, of course, where the wife is in-
fertile, artificial insemination would offer no remedy.
4 See biographical article on Dr. Hunter in 11 Encyclo. Brit. 919, and note in 1950
Wis. L. Rev. 136.
5 A biographical article on Dr. Sims appears in 25 Encyclo. Amer. 29.
6 The New York City ordinance is discussed below at note 65, post.
7 See report of Special Committee on Adoption Law, 26 Chicago Bar Rec. 359
(1945), particularly pp. 361-3.
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When the infertility of the husband is the sole cause of the
absence of children in families where they are strongly desired,
heterologous artificial insemination is recommended by many doc-
tors. However, as already stated, the opposition that exists rests
chiefly on religious grounds for, when medical men express oppo-
sition they do so because they are influenced by factors other
than those which are purely medical or biological. Dr. J. P. Green-
hill, practicing in Chicago, on the other hand, states:
All of my patients were highly selected as to intelligence,
health and youth . . . Nearly all of them have been among
the most grateful patients I have . . . From my discus-
sions with patients and their husbands, the children have
turned out very well and perhaps better than average .
All in all, I firmly believe that AID is a most useful con-
tribution and should be continued. In the cases where re-
ligion is opposed to AID, it should not be performed."
Lawyers too are mainly impressed by the paucity, or more cor-
rectly the almost total absence, of legal precedents on the point.
This fact has given rise to questions, sometimes rather far-
fetched, and raises hypothetical difficulties. As ecclesiastical
authorities also dwell on these same hypothetical difficulties be-
cause they wish to discourage the practice, attention should first
be given to the views expressed by men of religion.
I. RELIGIOUS VIEWS ON INSEMINATION
A. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ATTITUDE
All the Roman Catholic authorities whose pronouncements
have come to my attention9 have condemned AID although some
of them have said nothing at all about AIH. His Holiness Pope
Pius XII discussed both AID and AIH in three separate allocu-
tions. These pronouncements, while not technically ex cathedra,
are of such weight that no Roman Catholic authority would ques-
8 Letter to author under date of December 19, 1956.
9 1 am indebted to the Chancery Office of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Chicago for referring me to Catholic citations.
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tion them. The first, delivered to the Fourth International Con-
gress of Catholic Doctors on September 29th, 1943, makes it
clear that artificial insemination outside of marriage, i. e., when
unmarried women resort to it to obtain children of their own
without undertaking the obligations of marriage, is purely and
simply immoral, and the children are illegitimate. 10  While
extra-marital artificial insemination is not unknown on the con-
tinent of Europe, I have never heard of a case of this type in
the United States nor have I found an American writer advocat-
ing it, hence further comment would appear to be unnecessary.
This first Papal pronouncement also goes on to condemn AID
as practiced in America, that is the resort to artificial insemina-
tion in marriage but produced with the active element taken from
a third party, saying this conduct was "equally immoral, and as
such is to be condemned without recourse." The most important
points in support of this position are repeated in the Pope's own
words, to-wit:
Whoever gives life to a little human being, receives from
nature herself, in virtue of that very relationship, the re-
sponsibility for its conservation and education. But be-
tween the lawful husband and the child who is the fruit of
an active element derived from a third party (even should
the husband consent) there is no link of origin, no moral
and juridical bond of conjugal procreation . . . It would
be false to think that the possibility of resorting to this
means might render valid a marriage between persons who
are unfit to contract it by reason of the impediment of
impotence."
It is not for me to interpret this language, but the door does
not seem to be left open very wide, if at all, even for AIH, for
the allocution concludes as follows:
Although one cannot a priori exclude new methods because
they are new, yet, as far as artificial fecundation is con-
1o Acta Apo8tolicae Sedi8, Vol. 41, p. 577, translated in Bouscaren, Canon Law
Digest, Vol. 3, pp. 432-4.
11 Ibid.
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cerned, not only does it call for extreme reserve, it is ab-
solutely to be rejected. To say this is not necessarily to
proscribe the use of certain artificial means designed only
to facilitate the natural act, done in the normal way, to at-
tain this end.
Considering this language carefully, one possibly might con-
clude that the highest authority in the Roman Catholic Church
might not condemn unreservedly some means which might be
devised, perhaps in cases of hypospadias, e. g., for helping the
seed of the husband to find its way to the os of the cervix, or
even of actual intra-uterine or intracervical insemination. This
aid is all that is necessary in the opinion of Dr. Stuart Abel of
Chicago and of other authorities.12  There may, perhaps, be
some distinction between this and AIH, though to my non-clerical
mind the line of demarcation is not clear. It would seem to me,
however, that this language has led most Catholic authorities to
devote themselves chiefly to the condemnation of AID, while
seeming to adopt a somewhat non-committal attitude about AIH.
But, even if Pope Pius left the door open a little for AIH
in the allocution quoted, it would seem that he closed it beyond
all hope in a second one. On October 29th, 1951, when addressing
a gathering of Italian Catholic midwives, the Pope said: "To
reduce the cohabitation of married persons and the conjugal
act to a mere organic function for the transmission of the germ
of life would be to convert the domestic hearth, sanctuary of
the family, into nothing more than a biological laboratory.'""
Then, after referring to the earlier statement given to the Catholic
Doctors, His Holiness continued:
We formerly excluded artificial insemination from marriage.
The conjugal act in its natural structure is a personal ac-
tion, a simultaneous and immediate co-operation of the par-
ties which, by the very nature of the actors and the peculiar
12 A Symiposium on Medico-Legal Problems, Chicago Bar Association, 1948.
]. Acta Apostolicae Scdis, Vol. 43, p. 835. translated in Bonscaren, Canon Law
Digest. Vol. 3. p. 835.
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character of the act, is the expression of that mutual self-
governing which, in the words of holy scripture, effects a
union "in one flesh." This is much more than the union of
two life germs, which can be effected also artificially, that
is, without the natural action of the spouses. The conjugal
act, as it is ordained and willed by nature, is a personal
co-operation, the right to which the parties have mutually
conferred upon each other in contracting marriage. Hence,
when the performance of this function in its natural form is,
from the beginning, permanently impossible, the object of
the matrimonial contract is affected by an essential defect.1"
This language would seem to rule out AIH as well as AID.
Even more recently, Pope Pius XII again expressed him-
self on the same subject, this time in an allocution to the Sec-
ond World Congress on Fertility and Sterility, the text of which
is now available in English. His Holiness then said:
Artificial insemination is not within the rights acquired by
a couple by virtue of the marriage contract, nor is the right
to its use derived from the right to offspring as a primary
objective of matrimony. The marriage contract does not
confer the right because its aim is not "progeny" but "nat-
ural acts" capable of generating a new life. Therefore, ar-
tificial insemination violates the natural law and is con-
trary to what is right and moral.15
This latest statement, so far as I can see, does not modify or
add anything to the earlier statements. However, notwithstand-
ing this very definite language, the Pope did add: "This does
not mean that one must necessarily condemn the use of certain
artificial means, with the view of either facilitating the conjugal
act or attaining the objective of the normal act."' 6
14 Ibid.
15 The English translation may be found in the May 25, 1956, issue of New World
(Archdiocesan Journal of Chicago), at p. 1.
10 Ibid.
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While, in a papal decree of Pope Leo XIII issued in 1897,
artificial insemination had been pronounced illicit,17 some Catholic
writers would appear to think that the door has not been abso-
lutely closed.'8 I leave the reconciliation of these statements to
Roman Catholic authorities, but I point out that they do not
support the position of the few legal decisions which pronounce
AIH to be lawful, while denouncing AID as being adulterous.19
B. THE ANGLICAN POSITION
In December, 1945, the Archbishop of Canterbury appointed
a commission of thirteen members to consider human artificial
insemination. The report of this commission, first published in
1948 and then reprinted in 1952, is perhaps the most thorough
study on the subject which has yet appeared.20  It summarized,
both powerfully and fairly, the arguments in favor of AMl and
AID as well as those against them, but with the final conclusion
being against AID,2 much emphasis being placed on the secrecy
attending upon it and the deceit which would be inherent in the
falsification of birth registers. As to the latter, the report took
a position similar to that of the Roman Catholic Church, con-
demning AID and recommending the passage of legislation de-
signed to make it a criminal offense.
The report stressed the need for taking such legal action
because of the declining birth rate in England and the increas-
17 Special reference was made therein to masturbation, coitus iaterruptus, and
the use of the condom.
18 In an article in Ecclesiastical Review, Vol. 101, at p. 109, Reverend Gerald
Kelly, S.J., lists some thirteen Catholic authors who have written on the subject,
of whom six consider AIR to be illicit and seven think it probably licit.
19 Roman Catholic writers who have expressed themselves since the allocution
of Pope Pius XII include Rev. Anthony F. LoGatto, "Artificial Insemination:
Legal Aspects," 1 Cath. Lawyer 172-84 (1955), and Edmund H. Caddy, "Artificial
Human Insemination," 12 N. Y. Co. Lawyers Bar Bull. 193 (1955). Earlier writings
may be found listed in Glover, Artificial Insemination Among Human Beings
(Catholic University of America, Washington, 1948). For contrast thereto, see
Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1957), and Holloway, "Artificial Insemination: An Examination of the Legal
Aspects," 43 Am. Bar Ass'n Journ. 1089 (1957).
20 Information with respect thereto was graciously supplied by Dean Howard S.
Kennedy, St. James Episcopal Cathedral, Chicago.
21 The position was less conclusive as to AIH.
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ing incidence of sterility. These factors were said to point to
the danger of public acceptance of artificial insemination as a
future hazard to society. It declared that as the organization
of the family had largely disintegrated as an economic unit, with
its moral authority being invaded and its cultural functions being
absorbed by other agencies, all that remained to unite its mem-
bers was physical kinship and, with artificial insemination, even
that quality would be lost.
It should be noted, however, that there was no absolute una-
nimity in the report prepared by this commission. On one point
and one point only were all thirteen members in agreement and
that was that "assisted insemination by the husband was justifi-
able." Reverend R. C. Mortimer, an Oxford theological professor,
refused to agree that "where assisted insemination was inap-
plicable, other methods of artificial insemination may be justifi-
ably employed."
Dr. W. R. Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's, declined to sign the
report and, in an independent note, criticized the commission as
being too eager to reach a final and absolute judgment in a mat-
ter as yet very imperfectly understood. "After all," he said,
"one should be cautious in adding to the list of deadly sins."
While stating his strong repugnance to the whole idea, as be-
ing degrading to the conception of personality, he admitted that
we have "often to overcome instinctive repugnancies for the sake
of a higher good," hence he considered the psychological and
sociological objections as being almost entirely conjectural.
The striking point made by Dr. Matthews was that he did
not believe Christian theology to be immutable. "Theology," he
said, "has changed and is changing. It is the Christian ethic
of love which is eternal." 22 He therefore condemned, as crassly
materialistic, the legal conclusion that AID, when carried out at
the request of the husband and with due precaution against in-
justice to others, is adulterous; this because the "spiritual ele-
22 He did not find that Jesus deduced His ethical teaching from a theological
system, but rather that it came from His conviction that God is love.
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ments which constitute the sin of adultery are absent." He also
added that all the lay people to whom he had mentioned the
fact that some theologians regarded AID as equivalent to adul-
tery had received the information "with incredulity."
Finally, he criticized the theological section of the report
because it assumed a "static view of nature and of man which
was natural enough in the Middle Ages . . . It might have
been written by men who had never heard of evolution." In
his opinion, the report took a static view of society and of the
family, while he believed that "Christians ought not identify their
religion with things as they are, even in the case of the family."
The point of view of Dean Matthews is singularly important
to me. It reflects present sociological conclusions with regard to
the nature of our mores and to the changing aspects of our atti-
tudes toward the family in particular. It forms the basis, in
my opinion, for a general acceptance of artificial insemination
and for the removal of all bias with respect to it; bias being a
factor that only impedes progress.
To regress, it is not probable that Britain will enact legis-
lation condemning artificial insemination. In March, 1956, the
Royal Commission on Divorce Law did recommend a widening
of the grounds for divorce to include the artificial insemination
of a wife without her husband's consent, but this is all that this
commission has effected to date.1
3
C. THE LUTHERAN ATTITUDE
The Lutheran denomination, according to information sup-
plied me by the Reverend Otto Paul Kretzman, President of
Valparaiso University in Indiana, has never taken an official
position on either AID or AIH, hence there is no authoritative
statement which can be used in this connection. This does not
mean that no consideration has been given to the topic for some
23 [Editor's note: Time Magazine, Vol. LXXII, No. 10, at p. 74, notes that among
the 131 resolutions published by the Anglican Commission at its recent Lambeth
Conference of bishops was one which endorsed artificial insemination only if the
husband is the donor, i.e., AIH.]
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Lutheran authorities have examined into the matter and feel that
there is no basis for objection provided the usual precautions,
both biological and moral, are observed.14 Further study is now
being given to the subject by the Lutheran denominations but
the result thereof is not yet available. This rather non-committal
viewpoint would also seem to be characteristic of the more liberal
Protestant churches generally.
D. THE JEWISH POSITION
As is true with the Roman Catholic faith, the orthodox, as
well as the conservative, Jewish authorities base their position
on the proposition that there is a "natural" moral law which is
immutable; that this moral law was laid down by ancient Jewish
law-givers; that it has not changed; and that it never can be
changed. It is, of course, freely admitted that these law-givers
had never heard of a planned artificial insemination of a human
being but it is asserted as being obvious that, had they heard of
it, they would have condemned it. Nevertheless, the Jewish atti-
tude varies in ways which may be said to correspond roughly
with those of the several Christian groups, so separate discussion
thereof is necessary.
1. The Jewish Orthodox Attitude
All Jewish authorities" are influenced by the didactic teach-
ing of the Torah that man should be fruitful and multiply. For
this reason, it is considered obligatory for each Jewish couple to
bear a boy and a girl. Most orthodox Jewish authorities seem
to agree that AIR is not permissible except in cases where no
children have been born after ten years of marriage and where
it is impossible to have children by any other means. Further-
24 Appreciation is expressed to Dr. 0. P. Kretzmann, President of Valparaiso
University, Indiana, for the statement concerning the Lutheran attitude.
25 Acknowledgment is gratefully made for the assistance of Mr. Isaac Sender of
Chicago, who prepared a careful abstract of the orthodox Jewish authorities; to
Dr. David Graubert, Presiding Rabbi of the Chicago Council of the United
Synagogue of America, for a communication stating his views as a Conservative
Rabbi; and to Dr. Solomon B. Freehof, D.D., Rodef Sholom Temple, Pittsburgh, for
notes on the position of Liberal Rabbis.
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more, this fact must be established by the expert opinion of two
doctors and two rabbis.
A son born in this way would not have exactly the same
standing as if born as the result of procreation in the usual way.
He is legitimate, but if no other children are born of the marriage,
a widow must receive chalitza, that is ceremonial permission from
the nearest relative of the deceased husband, before re-marriage,
just as if no children had been born at all. It is doubted, there-
fore, whether the obligation to be fruitful is fulfilled by the pro-
duction of AIHI children.
The orthodox Jewish attitude in relation to AID, however,
seems paradoxical to the lay mind. AID children are considered
legitimate, but the practice of AID is nevertheless forbidden.
The husband whose wife gives birth to an AID child, whether
with his permission or not, may sue for divorce, but is not required
to do so.
Among the writers on the subject, it could be said that Rabbi
Isiah Gerelitz of Chicago, known as the Chayzan Ish, a very much
respected authority, is entirely opposed to artificial insemination.
A similar view is expressed by the unknown author of the
Responsa o*f Divrei Malgial. By contrast, Rabbi Sholom Mordecai
Ha-Cohen Shabron, Chief Rabbi of Berzen, Poland, would allow
the operation with the restrictions stated above, and similar views
have been expressed by Rabbi Ovadajah Joseph26 and by Rabbi
Jacob Braisl, Chief Rabbi of Zurich, Switzerland.
By way of explanation, some religious authorities, especially
the Jewish ones, base their objection to AIH on the ancient Jewish
rule against masturbation.27 So far as AID is concerned, some of
the difficulty appears to be generated by the Talmudic account of
the accidental insemination of his own daughter by the prophet
26 See Respon8a Yabi Omer, Vol. 2.
27 Some appear to think that this objection could be overcome by testicular
aspiration. This method of obtaining semen without masturbation, while not
absolutely impossible in theory, Is not supported, so far as I know, by any medical
authority. All the references I have found in medical literature have declared it
impractical.
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Jeremiah.2 s Orthodox rabbis treat this account as being literally
true while more liberal reformed Jewish scholars consider the
story as no more than a hypothetical case for discussion. How-
ever that may be, the conclusion seems inescapable that, where
there is no guilty intent, there is no sin.29
2. The Conservative Position
The Conservative Jewish viewpoint represents a middle
ground between the orthodox and the liberal groups. Dr. David
Graubert, Presiding Rabbi of the Chicago Council of the United
States of America, states that the theory regarding artificial
insemination in traditional Judaism is, much of it, conjectural
and mythical. On the other hand, conservative Judaism has not
formulated its position. While that position does not differ defi-
nitely from traditional Judaism, a more precise statement cannot
be made until the Law Commission of the Rabbinical Assembly of
America has issued a decision.
3. The Liberal Viewpoint
In his Responsa to the question whether artificial insemina-
tion is permitted by Jewish law, Dr. Solomon Freehof, of Rodef
Sholem Temple, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, makes a number of
points. It is best, therefore, to reproduce the Responsa in full
before adding any comment. Dr. Freehof writes:
1. Even though the technique of artificial insemination is
new, most of the questions raised by it are not new in the
Law, since the legal literature has already discussed them
with regard to analogous circumstances, such as, for example,
if a woman is impregnated in a bath from seed that has been
emitted there. (Cf. b. Chagiga 15 a top, Ibra b'Ambeti).
28 According to the Talmud, the prophet's daughter took a bath in the same water
in which her father had bathed. Evidently, he had had an emission of semen in
the water, and she gave birth to a son, Ben Sirah, in consequence. But there was
no sexual intercourse and no intention to procreate; therefore, as even the strictest
of orthodox rabbis declare, there was no sin. The rabbis also hold that the same
principle would apply if a woman occupied a bed after a man had had an emission
and she became accidentally impregnated by semen from the sheets.
29 For a full discussion from the orthodox Jewish point of view, see Dr. J.
Jakobovits, "Artificial Insemination, Birth Control and Abortion," 2 Harofd Haivri
(The Hebrew Medical Journal), p. 183.
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2. Joel Sirkes ('Bach' 1561-1640) to Tur Yore Deah 195
(quoting Semak) says that the child is absolutely kosher
(i.e., not a mamzer), since there has been no actual forbidden
intercourse (Ayn Kan bias issur).
3. Judah Rosanes (died in Constantinople, 1727) in his
Mishneh L'melech to Maimonides, Hiechos Ishus XV, 4,
declares that the woman is not immoral and is, therefore, not
forbidden to live with her husband.
4. But whose son is it? Samuel B. Uri Phoebus (17th Cen-
tury) in his commentary Bays Shenuel to Shulchan Aruch
Even Hozer 1, note 10, says that it is the son of the donor;
otherwise, we would not be concerned lest the child later
marry his own blood sister.
5. Since the development of the technique of artificial in-
semination, the subject has been discussed by Chayim Fischel
Epstein in his Teshuva Shelema (Even Hozer-4), and by
-Ben Zion Uziel of Tel Aviv, the Chief Sephardic Rabbi of
Palestine, in his Mishp 'te Uziel, Part II, Even Hozer, Sec-
tion 19.
It is Dr. Freehof's own opinion that the possibility that the child
may marry his own close blood kin is far-fetched, but that, since
the wife has committed no sin and the child is kosher, artificial
insemination should be permitted.
Professor Alexander Guttmann, H.U.C., of Cincinnati, in his
Responsa to the same question, also discusses the authorities at
length, and concludes that artificial insemination, as understood
today, is not mentioned in Rabbinic source literature. ° While he
says indications strongly point to a negative answer, particularly
if the seed of a stranger is to be used, he does not see sufficient
evidence for recommending the issuance of a prohibition against
artificial insemination. He cautions, however, against a hasty
30 le found the same references to accidental insemination mentioned in note
28, ante. It is hardly possible, however, to draw safe conclusions from the theo-
retical accidental insemination reported in the Jewish sources in relation to the
present practice.
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permit, for which he finds no significant agreement in Jewish
teachings.8 1
II. COMMENTARY ON RELIGIOUS VIEWS
Clearly, anyone who advocates heterologous artificial insemi-
nation must have some answer to the arguments of the more
conservative theologians. The writers previously referred to
assert that moral laws do not change with changing circumstances.
We may admit that fundamental moral laws do not change, but
they must be applied, as all laws must, to new situations. The
question is which laws are fundamental, and which are merely
adaptions to particular situations? The ancient law-givers for-
bade adultery, but permitted polygamy and concubinage. These
customs now would be considered immoral, since they are not
in accordance with the ethical standards of our own society.
There are many departures from ancient law. Divorce was
permitted in ancient Jewish law,32 as well as in other legal sys-
tems, but was later prohibited.3 3 The ancient Jewish law relating
to the levirate provided that should brothers dwell together and
one of them die and leave no son, the surviving brother must take
the widow as his wife, and the first son whom she bears must
succeed to the name of the deceased brother. If he refused to take
his brother's wife, he was subjected to a humiliating penalty.
3 4
This practice ceased with the abolition of polygamy. Likewise,
this custom is not, of course, in accordance with the present
practice of Christians or Jews, although it is discussed by Jesus
without any indication that he had any objection to it23 Clearly,
then, these laws relating to the family were not of immutable
character and have changed with changing concepts. Are not
other family doctrines open to the same influence?
31 Consult the Central Conference of American Rabbis, Yearbook 1953, Vol. 62,
pp. 123 et seq.
32 Deut., xxiv, v. 1-4.
33 Matt., v. 31-2; Mark, x, v. 2-12.
34 Deut., xxv, v. 5-10.
35 Mark, xii, v. 19-25.
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It is true that the Roman Catholic Church, and a few other
religious bodies, believes unreservedly not only in the immutabil-
ity of the moral or "natural" law but also that the Church has
infallible authority to interpret it." For those who so believe,
of course, the conclusions of the Church are final. But even they
cannot dispose of the question when it concerns persons not of
the same religious persuasion, notwithstanding such statements
as that of Albert S. Johnson, III, who writes that "the quantita-
tive weight of authority represents the view that artificial in-
semination is adultery and produces an illegitimate child" and
who asks the question whether society can be said "to evolve
moral principles ? "a3 Citing from Glover to the effect that, because
the principles concerning marriage and the sexual act have long
been given to man, "there can be no doubt whatever that heter-
ologous artificial insemination is an immoral practice and an
attack upon the unity of the marriage bond,"s3 Johnson concludes:
The legal solution lies not in a complex statute declaring
this undesirable and unnatural practice legal and providing
for all of its complicated legal ramifications, but rather in
the passing of a simple law declaring it illegal, as against
public policy and good morals. This is the only possible
natural law solution to the problem.
30
It is with this last paragraph that one has to take issue. Even
from a Catholic point of view, it is no solution. Respect for the
views of others is the very foundation of democracy. A practice
followed by thousands of people and supported by the leading
members of the medical profession should not be declared illegal
because it conflicts with the views of a certain segment of society,
even if that segment constituted a majority of the population.
To attempt to suppress the practice would create more problems
than it would solve. A better case could be made out for the
suppression of alcoholic drinking than for the suppression of
M0 See Encyclo. Social Sciences, Vol. 11, for article by Clemens Bauer on the title
"Papacy," particularly pp. 567-8, discussing this point.
37 Comment in 5 Cath. U. Amer. L. Rev. 189, at p. 191.
38 Glover, op. cit., note 19, ante.
39 5 Cath. U. Amer. L. Rev. 189, at p. 191.
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artificial insemination. The latter produces no helpless alcoholics,
nor has it been known to ruin anybody. But we have learned by
experience that to forbid alcoholic drinking by law produces more
evils than it cures.
If AID were to be declared illegal in some parts of the United
States, I believe the medical profession would certainly refuse to
practice it there, whatever might be the private opinions of indi-
vidual practitioners. Artificial insemination would then be driven
underground. If AID were driven underground, many couples
would go to the nearest jurisdiction where it could be legally
performed. We would have medical Renos for those who could
afford to travel thither. Some would try to inseminate them-
selves. Some would seek the aid of illicit practitioners. There
would be bootleg babies. Whatever evils may exist where the
practice is legalized would be increased enormously were it to be
declared illegal. It may be doubted whether the legal prohibition
of artificial insemination would prevent any couple who really
desired it and believed in it from having an AID or AIH baby.
In the interests of the baby, such married persons should be
allowed to have children by such means under the best possible
conditions, both medically and legally. Even those who believe
the practice to be morally wrong must admit the necessity of
recognizing its existence and of regulating it, just as they do
divorce, of which they also may disapprove.
But AID and AIH have not been declared illegal by any court
of last resort which had jurisdiction to decide the question. We
have some dicta on each side of the question, but we have no
decisions, and the dicta we have reflect the private views of indi-
vidual judges only. They are not based on legal precedents be-
cause there are no precedents.
III. THE LEGAL ASPECTS
It is admitted, at the outset, that both the common law rules
and all existing statutes dealing with marriage, divorce and
adultery are silent on the point of artificial insemination, princi-
pally because existing legal principles were laid down by judges
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or legislators who did not have the practice in mind and, in the
vast majority of instances, did not know that such a procedure
was possible.
There is now no law, common or statutory, either permitting
or denying the right to resort to artificial insemination. This is
true of every new discovery. Nobody ever thinks in advance of
seeking legal authorization for practices or customs about which
the law is not only silent but also ignorant. Nobody ever thought
of seeking legal authority for riding on trains or in automobiles
or for sailing on steamships or, at the present time, for the use
of space ships. Certainly, all such innovations raised new legal
problems and often moral ones as well. The older generations
among us can remember when it was thought wrong, or at least
unlady-like, for women to ride bicycles, and it is said that at
least one bishop in Canada forbade his clergy to make use of them.
Some among us, as youths, heard automobiles denounced as
devices of the Evil One, especially intended by him to induce
people to go pleasure-riding on Sunday instead of attending
church; and there can be no denying that the use of the automobile
has tended to reduce church-going. Such also seems to be the
case with artificial insemination but, leaving pure speculation
aside, let us examine the few case illustrations that do exist on the
point.
The Canadian case of Orford v. Orford41 gave rise to much
controversy. The action was one for alimony by a wife, who
alleged she had given birth to a child by means of artificial in-
semination from a donor, with the husband defending and refus-
ing to receive the plaintiff as his wife on the ground that she had
committed adultery. It was contended for the plaintiff that
heterologous artificial insemination (AID) did not constitute
adultery; that to constitute adultery, there must be actual normal
sexual intercourse outside of marriage. A distinction was at-
tempted to be drawn between the act of adultery, or sexual inter-
course outside of marriage, and insemination or pregnancy, which
4049 Ont. L. R, 15, 58 D. L. R. 251 (1921).
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might merely be the result of it. Certainly none would contend
that sexual intercourse which did not produce pregnancy was not
adultery. If pregnancy was obtained without such intercourse,
it should, therefore, not be considered to be adultery.
Having found as a fact that adultery had occurred in the
ordinary way, the court then turned to answer the plaintiff's
argument in detail. The term "adultery," it said, had never had
an exact meaning, nor had its meaning been the same in all
countries and under all systems of law, but that all definitions did
use the term "sexual intercourse," or some synonymous expres-
sion, to describe one of the necessary ingredients of adultery. As
plaintiff's counsel had argued that, without sexual intercourse,
there would be no adultery, the court felt obliged to extend itself
to show up the fallacy of relying upon the precise terms of a
definition without regard for the branch of law of which it formed
an element. In that connection, the court said:
It is admitted that there is no direct authority upon the exact
point. . . . The sin or offence of adultery, as affecting the
marriage, . . . may be traced from the Mosaic Law down
through the canon or ecclesiastical law to the present date.
• . In its essence, adultery was an invasion of the marital
rights of the husband and wife. The marriage tie had for its
primary object the perpetuation of the human race. The
Church of England's marriage service-the voice of the
Ecclesiastical Courts of England-gives as the first of the
causes for which matrimony was ordained, that of the pro-
creation of the human race. Can anyone read the Mosaic Law
. without being convinced that had such a thing as arti-
ficial insemination entered the mind of the law-giver, it would
have been regarded with the utmost horror as an invasion
of the most sacred rights of husband and wife, and have been
the subject of the severest penalties? . . . The essence of the
offence of adultery consists . . . in the voluntary surrender
to another person of the reproductive powers or faculties of
the guilty person. Sexual intercourse is adulterous because
in the case of the woman it involves the possibility of intro-
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ducing into the family of the husband a false strain of blood.
Any act of the wife which does that would, therefore, be
adulterous."
It then added that, if it were necessary to do so, it would hold
that "the introduction into the wife's body of seed of a man other
than her husband," would, for this purpose, be considered as
''sexual intercourse. "
This statement is, however, a clear obiter dictum since the
court had expressed complete disbelief in the wife's statement
that she had been artificially inseminated and had decided the
case on the assumption that adultery had been committed in the
ordinary way. True, the judge made a lengthy and careful state-
ment as to what his decision would have been had he believed that
AID had actually taken place and, as indicated by the foregoing
excerpts, a holding would have been achieved upon the basis of
Mosaic Law as interpreted by the Ecclesiastical Courts of Eng-
land. But the fact remains, the conclusion reached was an elabo-
rate dictum and no more.
In this respect, the court was merely following the beaten
track of jurisprudence in those areas where the English common
law prevails. There can be no denying the correctness of the
method from the strictly legal point of view, whether or not we
agree with the conclusion attained. But may not one be permitted
to express a doubt whether the rule so announced would conform
to the wishes of the vast majority of American citizens or be in
accord with the spirit underlying the Constitution of the United
States.
The English common law has, of course, been greatly altered
by statute, including all the legislation which affects divorce and
matrimonial causes, but on any point not so affected, courts still
tend to rely on the old ecclesiastical law of that country. This is
still more anomalous when it is remembered that the First Amend-
ment, with the tacit reference thereto in the Fourteenth Amend-
4149 Ont. L. R. 15 at 21-2, 58 D. L. R. 251 at 257-8.
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ment, forbids the passage of laws "respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The point
may be raised whether the subjection of the most intimate rela-
tions of life to ecclesiastical law, regardless of the religious con-
victions of those most concerned, is not really a very substantial
breach of this principle.
While there has been quite a substantial departure from the
English ecclesiastical law12 in regard to divorce, legitimacy,
3
and other family matters, all these departures have been accom-
plished by statutory change for there is, generally, no other way
by which change in the common law can be effected. This fact
would, similarly, indicate the desirability of, if not the necessity
for, legislation to regulate artificial insemination instead of leav-
ing to the courts the impossible task of twisting older principles
in a vain endeavor to make them cover a question which was never
in the minds of the ancient law givers. Also, since a considerable
number of citizens do not consider artificial insemination to be
repugnant to their religious convictions, is it not a flagrant breach
of their fundamental constitutional principles to fabricate a
judge-made rule designed to forbid them from participating in
the practice because it might contravene the religious views of
some other group ? Might we not just as logically forbid divorce ?
A very different view from that of the Orford case was
expressed, in 1948, in the New York case of Strand v. Strnctd.
44
There, a husband who had been legally separated from his wife
claimed the right of visitation with respect to a child born to his
wife. The child was admittedly born by heterologous artificial
42 It would seem pertinent here to point out that the system of ecclesiastical law
prevalent in England, being the law of the Anglican Church, was a part of the law
of that country only because that church was a church "by law established."
Whatever may have been the precise implication of the last-quoted phrase, it
would seem that not only the establishment of a church but also the imposition of
a body of church law on the American public would be contrary to American
constitutional principles.
43 Strict adherence to the ecclesiastical views expressed in the Orford case would,
of course, result in making all AID children, and perhaps also the AIH children,
illegitimate. The bastardization of any child is repugnant to the modern mind as
well as to the trend of both the statutory law and to judicial decisions of the
recent past: Vernier, American Family Laws (Stanford University Press, Cali-
fornia, 1936), Vol. 4, § 242 et seq.
44 190 Misc. 786, 78 N. Y. S. (2d) 396 (1945).
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insemination, which latter was assumed to have been effected by
the husband's consent. The wife resisted, but the court held the
child to be legitimate with the husband being entitled to a right
of visitation, such visitation being said to be in the best interests
of the child. Although the court expressly refrained from passing
on property rights and as to the propriety of artificial insemina-
tion, said to be a matter resting in the fields of sociology, morality
and religion rather than in law, it treated the child as if it had
been potentially adopted, with the husband being entitled to the
rights of a foster parent if not those of a natural parent.4  The
situation was held to be no different, in effect, from that of a
child born out of wedlock and subsequently legitimized by the
marriage of the parents. Noteworthy as the outcome of the case
might be, it resolved nothing with respect to the point under
consideration for it turned on the cardinal principle utilized in all
custody and similar suits, to-wit: the interests of the child take
precedence over all other considerations.
In much the same way the English case designated L. v. L.
46
arrived at a somewhat regrettable result. The wife there con-
cerned sued to have the marriage annulled on the ground of her
husband's psychological impotence.47 It seemed that the husband
had so strong an objection to normal intercourse that he could
not take part in it. The wife, in the hope, as the court found, of
bringing about a change in his attitude and making the marriage
a normal one, artificially inseminated herself with her husband's
semen, and produced a child. This did not change the husband's
attitude, and annulment was granted, with the consequent result
that the child was pronounced illegitimate.48
45 It is understood that the wife subsequently moved to Oklahoma and that a
court in that state denied the husband's right of visitation.
46R. E. L. (Otherwise R) v. E. L., [1949] Probate Div. 211, [1949] 1 All Eng.
L. R. 141.
47 Although, in Illinois, the condition must, according to il. Rev. Stat. 1957,
Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 1, be a physical one, the doctrine of psychological impotence is
recognized by some courts. Compare Griffeth v. Griffeth, 162 Ill. 368, 44 N. E. 820
(1896), with Tompkins v. Tompkins, 92 N. J. Eq. 113, 111 A. 599 (1920).
48 The holding in the case produced a statutory change in the law of England,
one designed to legitimize children despite the annulment of the marriage existing
between the parents: Law Reform Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. VI, c. 100.
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Again, the case has no direct bearing on the question whether
artificial insemination is, or should be considered to be, lawful.
The court expressly based its decision on the wife's desire to
render normal an abnormal marriage; and the opinion does not
indicate whether she was really justified in "calling in the un-
natural aid of science" for that laudable purpose. The ultimate
solution for problems such as these would seem to lie in the
general feeling of tolerance which is fast increasing. Indeed, it
may well be doubted whether there would ever be any prejudice
against artificial insemination, or against the ensuing children,
were it not for the existing propaganda against it.
So far as the law of Illinois is concerned, mention should be
made of three nisi prius cases, each of which arose in Cook
County. In the first of them, that of Hoch v. Hoch,49 it was a
defense contention that, although the child borne by the wife was
an AID child, this fact did not constitute adultery on the part
of the wife. Considerable attention was drawn to the case by the
remarks of the late Judge Michael Feinberg, running counter to
the dictum in the Orford case,5" but the divorce was eventually
granted on other grounds so no determination on the point under
consideration was ever reached therein.
Some nine years later, in Doornbos v. Doornbos,51 a wife
sought, and eventually obtained, a divorce on the ground of her
husband's habitual drunkenness. There was a child which, accord-
ing to the uncontradicted testimony of the petitioner,52 was an
AID child produced with the defendant-husband's consent. Dur-
ing the pendency of the case, the wife petitioned the court for a
declaratory judgment concerning the status of the child, seeking
to ascertain whether artificial insemination constituted adultery,
whether such practice was contrary to public policy, and whether
a child so produced was legitimate as to both partners to the
49 No. 44-C-9307, Circuit Court of Cook County.
50 See note 40, ante.
51 No. 54-S-14981, Superior Court of Cook County.
52 The testimony in the case showed that the husband had been tested for
sterility; that AID had been performed by a qualified medical practitioner of
unquestioned repute; and that both husband and wife had consented.
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marriage or was the child of the mother only. The trial judge in
the case, the Hon. Gibson E. Gorman, in response to this petition,
appears to have been the first to make a direct judicial pronounce-
ment on the subject. He declared that heterologous artificial in-
semination, with or without the consent of the husband, was
"contrary to public policy and good morals, and constitutes adul-
tery on the part of the mother." It followed therefrom that a
child so conceived would not be a child born in wedlock and would,
therefore, be illegitimate. Being such, it would be the child of the
mother only and the other spouse would have neither right nor
interest in such child.1
3
The wife in the case mentioned, notwithstanding the effect
of the decree on the legitimacy of her child, obtained her long-
waited divorce with sole custodial rights, so she did not appeal.
The husband, of course, was relieved of all duty of support and
the like, hence had no ground for appeal on that score." The
matter would have stopped there, but the trial judge had asked
the local state's attorney to intervene on behalf of the State of
Illinois as parens patriae, and that official had done so. He had
urged that a decree putting the stigma of illegitimacy on the child
would deprive the child of the right to support and of inheritance
from the defendant. In addition to pointing out that the burden
of support would fall on the state if the mother failed to provide
for the child, the state's attorney invoked the presumption that a
child born to the parties to a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate,5 a presumption which yields only where there is clear
and irrefragable proof of illegitimacy. 6  As a corollary, the
53 Judge Gibson E. Gorman, by way of dictum, also said that homologous artificial
insemination, wherein the specimen of semen used is obtained from the husband of
the woman, is "not contrary to public policy and good morals, and does not present
any difficulty from the legal point of law."
54 The record discloses that the husband sought to have the child declared
legitimate as he desired the right of visitation, but visitation was denied to him.
He might have appealed from this aspect of the decision, but did not.
55 The presumption stems from the holding of Lord Mansfield in the case of
Goodright ex dem. Stevens v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
56 Evidence in the case did tend to show that natural intercourse took place
within the time of possible conception and that, while the husband had been treated
for sterility, there was no proof to establish the absolute impossibility of concep-
tion through him. The attending gynecologist, Dr. Joseph F. Angell, testified that
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state 's attorney invoked the statutory provision which declares
that divorce should not affect the legitimacy of the children of a
valid marriage 7 and the rule which forbids either spouse from
testifying as to access or non-access in cases concerning the legiti-
macy of children.
Following upon the denial of a petition to vacate that portion
of the decree relating to the husband's non-responsibility for the
support of the child, the state appealed. The appeal was dis-
missed by the Appellate Court for the First District on purely
procedural grounds with that court expressly stating that it did
not rule on the question of the legitimacy of children conceived
in the manner described.5 s Time for further appeal having ex-
pired, the decision of Judge Gorman stands as the law between
the parties to the case and, presumably, the law in the state
until such time as the question can be brought properly to the
attention of a reviewing tribunal or until some legislative action
is taken. If this ruling should stand, however, it would leave little
room for further legal controversy, at least in Illinois.59
Before leaving the subject, it is proper to make mention of
the fact that, in the third nisi prius determination in Illinois, that
attained in the case of Oh~son. v. Ohlson,6 ° a wife was denied the
right to testify that her child was the result of heterologous arti-
ficial insemination (AID). The evidence was excluded on the
ground that neither spouse may be permitted to testify to access
or non-access during a valid marriage when the effect of such
sterility, plus impotency, was necessary to negate the possibility of conception
through natural intercourse. In the circumstances, he could not definitely state
whether this child was conceived as a result of artificial insemination or natural
intercourse. It also appeared that pregnancy had resulted after the first injection,
which is not usual.
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957. Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 4.
58 12 Ill. App. (2d) 173, 139 N. E. (2d) 844 (1956), abst. opin.
59 The author of a note on the Doornbos case in 43 Georgetown L. J. 517 argues
that present definitions of adultery, "not having been formulated with artificial
insemination in mind, are inadequate, and that a more comprehensive definition is
necessary." The same commentator, referring to the many medical and sociological
problems involved, concludes that the cases "already decided clearly indicate the
inadequacy of the existing law to do justice in a situation which the framers of
that law never conceived." I wish strongly to express my agreement with this
conclusion.
60 No. 53-8-1410, Superior Court of Cook County.
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testimony would be to bastardize a child whose legitimacy had
once been acknowledged. A holding of this character would tend
to indicate that almost all AID children, as well as those by AIH,
would have to be regarded as legitimate simply because of the
practical impossibility of proving non-access. It would seem that,
in cases where the husband's semen has been mixed with that of
a donor, there could be no possibility whatever of proof that the
husband was not the biological father, so such children would
certainly be legitimate. But, under the Doornbos ruling and in
AID cases, the children, while technically illegitimate, would have
to pass as legitimate for all practical purposes because of the
want of adequate independent testimony. It is more than doubtful
that reputable physicians, faced with this dilemma, would be
willing to perform AID in the future. In that event, the evil of
"bootleg" babies would be upon us. Truly the case for legisla-
tive action for the protection of children, if not for their parents,
grows stronger every step of the way.
IV. RECOGNITION OF AID
Basically, the question is one as to whether or not AID, as
well as AIH, should be legally recognized and regulated or should
be pronounced illegal. Either end could be achieved only by
statutory enactment for it is perfectly clear that the few decisions
handed down to date are either nothing but pure dicta or are
irreconcilable and totally without support in precedent.
Before proceeding to a discussion of that question, it might
be well to resolve a few subordinate points. It has been claimed
that progressive medical science should aim rather at finding
remedies for infertility rather than aid in the promotion of arti-
ficial insemination. Even if it were certain that all infertility
would eventually be overcome, which is more than doubtful, the
short answer to this suggestion is that society is faced with a
very pressing problem currently in relation to the many childless
couples who ardently desire to have children now. It is no solution
to their profound disappointment to suggest that, perhaps at
some future date, medical science may find a remedy. Their diffi-
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culty is now, and AID, if not AIH, is the present remedy in
thousands of these cases.
It has also been suggested that, even under the present un-
satisfactory state of the law, all difficulties could be overcome if
the husband of the woman who resorted to AID would adopt the
child. Doubtless, all legal difficulties would be resolved if an
adoption should take place. But what if the husband, after having
so agreed, should refuse to petition for adoption? If the consid-
eration for the agreement to adopt rested on the promise that
AID should take place, and if AID is illegal, because opposed to
public policy, then would not the promise to adopt be unenforci-
ble?" Dr. J. P. Greenhill adds another thought when he suggests
that the seeming solution to be found in an adoption proceeding
is offset by the possibility of undesirable publicity.
62
Still another argument advances the possibility that AID
babies may exhibit deformities, leading to socially undesirable
possibilities. By way of answer, Dr. Greenhill stated that, in his
experience,63 he had found none and he expressed the belief that
the incidence of deformity would be no higher than in the case
of ordinary conceptions, which he put at 1%, quoting Seymour
and Koerner who had also found the figure to be low. 4 But in-
61 As to the effect of illegality with respect to consideration in promises based on
adoption and the like, see the case of Willey v. Lawton, 8 Ill. App. (2d) 344,
132 N. E. (2d) 34 (1956).
62 See 116 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 2747. The author thereof, like most physicians who
have expressed themselves is, on the whole, in favor of AID practice. He thinks
adoption is unnecessary because the husband and wife alike usually want the
manner of conception kept secret. He indicates that, in his experience, not one
woman even told her parents. As to the publicity argument, it might be said that
adoption proceedings seldom attract attention provided there is no contest. If it
should be thought desirable to resolve all problems in this fashion, the legislature
could direct that the adoption should be deemed to have occurred at the time the
husband consented to AID, if a child was thereby produced, and could also take
steps to reduce, or eliminate, publicity in relation to adoption matters. See I1.
Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 4-3, and Vol. 2, Ch. 111'/2, § 48a, et seq., in relation
to the change which can be made in the matter of the birth registration of an
adopted child, and Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 6-2, concerning the impounding of adoption
papers and records.
63 In a symposium on the subject, Dr. Greenhill did state that he had delivered
fewer than 100 "test-tube" babies.
64 No use has been made herein of the statistics piiblished by Seymour and
Koerner. which have been criticized for their alleged inaccuracy. See Folsome.
45 Am. Jour. of Obstetrics and Gynecology 9-4 (1943). and Abel, 85 Int. Abst. of
Surgery, Gynecology and Obstetrics 528 (1947). While I express no opinion aboult
these statistical conclusions, I do believe these writers have made a real contribu-
tion to the discussion.
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stead of concentrating on every possible untoward result of AID,
as if no unhappy consequences ever followed in other circum-
stances, some attention should be paid to the successes which
have resulted. One unidentified participant in the Chicago
Bar Association Symposium of AID stated that he knew of
one family where the three children each had a different bio-
logical father yet the husband was as proud of the offspring as
he could be. The children were said to be smarter and better than
average because, in the words of the speaker, "We usually get a
very intelligent mother to start with, and our donors are not the
scum of the earth. They are the highest type of men, both physi-
cally and mentally, that we can pick."
Nevertheless, some medical men believe the physician must
consider the ethical, legal and religious aspects as well as the
purely medical ones. Of course, no honorable professional man
would do anything he considered to be morally wrong or contrary
to his religion, whether it was legally permissible or not. On the
other hand, once the practice is legalized, while some physicians
may refuse to perform it, there will be others who would con-
sider they were doing a humanitarian act by so practicing, one
well in the interest of children and parents alike. It is difficult
to understand why so many people, typically those belonging to
the three professions here primarily concerned, i.e., law, medicine
and theology, should think it necessary to take more precautions
in the case of AID than they would in other situations.
For instance, Dr. Koerner thinks it very essential for the
physician to discover whether or not the prospective parents are
capable of supporting the child in a proper manner. But why is
that the doctor's business? And why does nobody think it is his
business, or that of the clergy, to inquire into such matters when
a couple wants to get married, and to forbid the marriage of
irresponsible or physically unfit people? Wisely, we leave that
to the judgment of the parties concerned, not always with the
happiest results. It is recognized that interference would cause
more evils than it would cure. A married couple may produce
as many children as nature permits, and no one has a right to
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interfere. Why should it be otherwhen when a sterile husband
and a fertile wife decide to resort to AID? When it is suggested
that an unstable husband might withdraw his approval after his
wife is inseminated, might he not just as well repent that he
ever got married? Or that he ever procreated in the ordinary
way?
Leaving these arguments aside, it would be appropriate to
comment on the fact that, to date, no legislation on the point has
been passed in any American state. While it is true that the City
of New York may be said to have acknowledged that AID is not
illegal, by passing an ordinance designed to regulate the prac-
tice,65 the state legislature of New York has declined to pass a
bill making AID practice legal. The same thing is true also in
the states of Virginia, Indiana, Wisconsin and Minnesota, except
that the Minnesota bill, while it would have made artificial in-
semination unlawful, would have legitimized the children. Ili
Ohio, on the other hand, it was proposed to prohibit AID under
penal sanctions and also to declare the children illegitimate. This
measure also failed to pass.
But AID is knocking at the door. The American Society for
the Study of Sterility, offering an opinion which represents the
view of approximately five hundred specialists in the field, has
approved artificial insemination as being a "completely ethical,
moral and desirable form of medical therapy, '16 provided it is
done pursuant to the following conditions: (1) the urgent desire
of the married couple to have this solution of their infertility
problem; (2) the careful selection, by the physician, of a biologi-
cally and genetically satisfactory donor; and (3) the opinion of
the physician, after thorough study, that the married couple
65 Under this ordinance, only a duly licensed physician "shall collect, offer for
sale, sell or give away human seminal fluid for the purpose of causing artificial
insemination . . ." New York City Sanitary Code (1947), § 112. The regulations
also provide for physical examination of donors to ascertain their freedom from
certain diseases and from hereditary defects, for blood tests, and for the keeping
of records, which are to be confidential and open only to authorized persons.
66 See report of a meeting of that society, held at Atlantic City in 1955, appearing
in the New York Times under date of June 5, 1955. Dr. John 0. Haman, of San
Francisco, the retiring president, said the Society was comprised of an overwhelming
majority of doctors who practice this type of medicine.
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would make desirable parents. The resolution in question goes on
to say:
Those physicians who have carried out donor inseminations
for several decades can attest that in many cases it is a more
desirable procedure than adoption. One great advantage of
donor insemination is that it provides the opportunity for the
husband to share the months of his wife's pregnancy and
her childbirth. From observation over many years, the mem-
bership is impressed by the almost universal good results
achieved in respect to children and the entire family unit.
The fact that, in some instances, parents have returned for
as many as four children by donor insemination, is further
proof of the happiness it bestows.67
Under these conditions, the characteristics of the husband,
so far as possible, are to be matched in making a selection of the
donor. The donor must, for example, have similar hair and eyes,
and should be of the same race. If the wife's blood is RH nega-
tive, so must that of the donor be. As selection techniques become
more developed, donors will be selected with a blood type similar
to that of the husband. Gone are the days when almost any
donor not obviously unsuitable was used, though even then mental
disease, if known, defective eyes or hearing, diabetes, venereal
disease and inheritable defects were unacceptable traits in the
donor.
One objection to artificial insemination which seems, on its
face, to have more merit is the possibility that a donor who is a
near relative may inseminate a wife, both parties being in ignor-
ance of the relationship." Here again, one is bound to remark
67 Ibid. Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher, head of the Department of Gynecology and
Obstetrics of Mount Sinai -Hospital, New York, says: "These children mean more
to families than children conceived in the normal manner. But for artificial in-
semination, motherhood would be denied the wife. The husband knows that at
least half the child's inheritance is good-it comes from his own wife, and he has
his physician's assurance that the other half is of the best. Babies conceived in
this manner are wanted children. They are welcomed into families with love. I
know of not a single case where things have worked out badly." See 19 Bull. N. Y.
Acad. of Medicine 576 (1943).
68 The point is suggested in Barton, Walker and Weisner, "Artificial Insemina-
tion," 1945 Brit. Med. Journ. 40-3.
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that, in view of the secrecy usually present in relation to adop-
tions, it is possible that a marriage within the prohibited degrees
could happen to adopted children or indeed to any two people
who, from any cause, may be ignorant of their ancestry. Yet no
one seems to have worried about that possibility. Granted that
the chances would be greater if an AID donor were to sire a
tremendous number of offspring, still the danger is exceedingly
remote and, if it happened in an isolated case, there would, in all
probability, be little or no biological harm done. In any event,
American donors are generally limited to one hundred instances
and it is not uncommon, now that sperm banks can be transmitted
over great distances, for the donor to be a resident of a distant
part of the country. In any case, the physician who selects the
donor should, and would, always make inquiry about ancestry and
would not knowingly choose anyone within the prohibited degrees
of kinship.69
The existence of a sperm bank, analogous to the blood bank,
appears to be an objectionable aspect of the practice which seems
to be particularly obnoxious to some. One Catholic writer re-
marked ominously that a sperm bank was "just around the cor-
ner. "1 As a matter of fact, several such banks exist, both in the
United States as well as abroad.7 But the objection is one at the
semantic level rather than one of substance. Much the same thing
is true as to the one voiced by the late Cardinal Griffin who spoke
of artificial insemination as the "stud breeding of human beings"
and of the donor as being reduced to the "status of a stallion."
The condemnation is singularly inept. Animals and human beings
alike, when left to their own devices, procreate in the ordinary
"natural" way. When humans do that, they are doing what all
69 For purpose of this discussion, suppose a rare case of consanguinous marriage
should occur between two AID children. In such a case, incest would be present if
the parties were cognizant of the fact but not if, as undoubtedly would be the case,
they lacked knowledge on the point. Being ignorant, they could not be incestuous
by intent. Where there would be no crime, there would be no sin.
70 Caddy, "Artificial Human Insemination," 12 N. Y. Co. Lawyers Bar Bull. 193
(1955).
71 Human semen can now be frozen and preserved. It is reported that several
women have recently been successfully so impregnated at the University of Iowa.
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animals do of their own accord. There is nothing especially animal
about human beings who resort to scientific aid when nature fails
them. Rather, the contrary applies.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is not necessary here to comment on some possible extreme
applications which could be found for the principles of AID,72
other than to say that whatever is found to produce the finest
type of human being will eventually come to be recognized and
practiced. Those communities which refuse to adopt whatever
points in that direction will eventually be left behind by more
progressive communities. What is needed, then, is a full and
frank discussion of artificial insemination in all of its phases.
It is not enough, indeed it is not possible, either to dismiss
it or to pronounce it illegal just because some people insist that
human conduct must be ruled by immutable laws laid down by
ancient law givers. Such persons have no right, in a free and
democratic society, to force their views on others. It is necessary
to remind them that no one is proposing, or could conceivably
propose, to force artificial insemination, AIH or AID, on any
woman who does not desire it. Those who do not desire it, or
who think it is wrong, need not resort to it. That much must be
freely conceded. Therefore, so far as such persons are concerned,
the authorities have spoken and the controversy is at an end.
The question at issue concerns only those who believe in progress
and in the continuous adaption of human conduct to changing
conditions. And if freedom means anything at all, surely it must
mean that people should be allowed to decide their own course of
conduct, so long as it does not interfere with that of others.
This does not mean moral anarchy, any more than religious
freedom means moral anarchy. It does not mean that people will
72 The startling suggestion has been made that, if wars continue to deplete the
manpower of the world. so that some countries, as is the case now in Germany, end
up with a large female surplus, all virtuous unmarried women, unable to find
husbands but who desire to have children, should be permitted to resort to AID
and be enabled to raise legal offspring. I offer no comment other than to say that
such things are already happening in Europe.
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be without any guidance in matters concerning sex and family. It
does mean that everybody, and in this connection especially every
woman, shall, under the advice of moral and medical experts of
his or her own choosing, have the final say regarding his or her
own sexual and reproduction functions.
This may raise questions for which, at present, the law has
no answers. But answers must be found, for the influence of
religion on law constitutes a major stumbling block in the path of
progress in scientific and social thought as well as the reason
for much of the cultural lag in the changing aspects of the modern
family. Not until the attitudes of the total adult population have
been scientifically determined by statistical and other sociological
methods, perhaps, could the just status of artificial insemination
be defined or the degree of "obsoleteness" in current views be
revealed. A small-scale investigation points toward a trend of
thought."8 Is not now the time to secure and to publicize the
results of a mass survey? If one were to be taken, the belief is
that it would reveal an acceptance of artificial insemination as
being an integral part in a revised concept of the family when
viewed as a modern social institution.
73 See the results obtained from a brief pilot investigation conducted by the
author, reported in 4 J. Forensic Medicine 147-72 (1957), particularly pp. 169-71.
